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Summary
Proponents of robust mortgage finance regulation would do well to look to the states, and specifically to the
regulatory effects of state-mandated judicial foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in almost
half of U.S. states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage file an action in state court. This not
only provides borrowers with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior and obligations, but
puts the onus on the lender to show that the requirements for foreclosure have been met. It also aids
borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing them to remain in their homes for longer periods
while in default. In this brief, Professor Brian Feinstein empirically examines the effects of judicial foreclosure
on lender behavior and mortgage costs for consumers. The findings indicate that judicial foreclosure alters
lender behavior in ways that are beneficial to borrowers, and that mirror regulatory goals. Lenders exhibit
greater caution in loan-approval decisions and offer fewer subprime loans. These results are amplified for
lower-income borrowers. Importantly, the costs imposed on lenders by judicial foreclosure do not appear to
get passed on to borrowers in the form of higher rates.
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State Foreclosure Law:  
A Neglected Element of the 
Housing Finance Debate
Brian D. Feinstein, JD, PhD
More than a decade after U.S. mortgage lending sparked a global financial crisis, 
Washington’s treatment of the mortgage-finance industry has taken  
a deregulatory turn.  
In the first 21 months of the Trump administration, 
activity levels across the federal government—from 
CFPB consumer-protection enforcement actions, 
to SEC fines against banks, to Justice Department 
lending-discrimination lawsuits—are markedly 
lower than during the final 21 months of the Obama 
administration. Proponents of a robust mortgage-
finance regulatory framework are playing defense: 
focusing on maintaining ex ante federal regulations 
concerning the availability of credit to borrowers and 
the appropriateness of the mortgage products offered  
by lenders.
These proponents would be well served by also 
devoting attention to the states. In this Issue Brief, 
I show how the legal framework governing ex post 
borrower protections—specifically, state foreclosure 
procedures—can help address this challenging policy 
problem. State legislators would do well to understand 
how various foreclosure regimes across all 50 states 
affect mortgage lending so that they can tailor their 
state’s foreclosure regime to their state’s specific needs. 
Given the deregulatory trend at the federal level, 
advocates of strong regulation of lending practices 
SUMMARY
• The momentum in Washington currently trends toward deregulation 
of the mortgage-finance industry. Given these circumstances, 
proponents of maintaining a more robust regulatory framework 
should look to the power of the states, and specifically to 
state-mandated judicial foreclosure.
• Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in almost half of U.S. 
states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage 
file an action in state court. This not only provides borrowers 
with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior 
and obligations, but puts the onus on the lender to show that 
the requirements for foreclosure have been met. It also aids 
borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing 
them to remain in their homes for longer periods while in default. 
• New empirical research discussed in the brief indicates that 
judicial foreclosure also alters lender behavior in ways that 
are beneficial to borrowers, and that mirror regulatory goals. 
Lenders exhibit greater caution in loan-approval decisions and 
offer fewer subprime loans. These results are amplified for 
lower-income borrowers.
• Importantly, the costs imposed on lenders by judicial foreclosure 
do not appear to get passed on to borrowers in the form of 
higher rates.
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ought to look to the states—including 
to state foreclosure law as a form of ex 
post mortgage-finance regulation.
Almost half of U.S. states mandate 
judicial foreclosure, which requires 
that lenders seeking to foreclose on 
a mortgage file an action in state 
court. In these states, courts provide 
a forum for borrowers to challenge 
both lenders’ adherence to the state’s 
foreclosure procedures (the back-
end) and their behavior at the loan 
origination stage (the front-end). 
Borrowers in all states may raise a 
broadly similar set of arguments, as 
defenses to the lender’s foreclosure 
action in judicial foreclosure states 
or as causes of action in non-judicial 
foreclosure states. The key difference 
between the two procedures is that 
judicial foreclosure places on the 
lender the burden of demonstrating 
that the requirements to foreclose 
are met. In other states, by contrast, 
the burden is on the borrower 
to affirmatively file suit to claim 
that the lender did not meet these 
requirements. 
The benefits to borrowers of 
mandatory judicial foreclosure are 
readily apparent. Judicial supervision 
helps to ensure that lenders meet 
all requirements to foreclose, and 
court involvement slows down 
the foreclosure process, enabling 
borrowers to remain in their homes, 
without making payments, for a 
longer period. The costs to borrowers 
of a mandatory judicial forum, 
however, are contested. If the 
procedure’s obvious costs to lenders 
are passed on to borrowers in the 
form of higher interest rates, then—
depending on one’s view of delinquent 
borrowers—judicial foreclosure 
either serves as an inefficient form 
of insurance paid by all borrowers 
(through those potentially higher 
rates) to compensate unfortunate 
ones or provides an unfair windfall to 
irresponsible borrowers at the expense 
of responsible ones. 
To determine the effect of 
judicial foreclosure requirements on 
mortgage pricing, I compared loan 
application decisions in 14 pairs of 
neighboring states, where both states 
have substantially similar foreclosure 
procedures but for the fact that one 
state mandates judicial foreclosure 
and the other does not. To account 
for differences in states’ real estate 
markets or economies, I focused 
exclusively on loan applications within 
metro areas that straddle state lines 
and in state border regions in these 
14 pairs of states.1  To ensure that I 
was comparing similar individuals 
across state lines, I included a battery 
of individual- and neighborhood-level 
demographic variables. Finally, to 
address differences in the regulatory 
treatment of different lenders, I 
restricted my analysis to nationally 
chartered banks in 2005, because the 
federal Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) was the 
exclusive banking regulator of these 
entities in that year.2 
Judicial foreclosure affects 
borrowers and lenders, and it has 
implications for policymakers. To 
preview the results, I find that lenders 
adopt a more conservative posture in 
judicial foreclosure states, exhibiting 
greater caution in loan-approval 
decisions, and—for those applicants 
that are approved—lenders offered 
fewer subprime loans. Importantly, 
these results were amplified for lower-
income borrowers. 
That ex post foreclosure law can 
have a similar effect on lenders’ 
origination behavior as does ex ante 
regulation should interest state 
lawmakers who are concerned about 
Washington’s deregulatory turn in 
mortgage-finance regulation. State 
governments looking to maintain 
conservative lending behavior—
particularly to lower-income people—
in the face of potential federal 
  1  This Issue Brief is based on Brian D. Feinstein, “Judging 
Judicial Foreclosure,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 
15(2), 406-451 (2018).
  2  These data were obtained from the federal Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) Final Loan Application Register 
dataset. In 2005, 8,848 lenders filed 33.6 million loan 
application reports under the HMDA. The OCC regulated 
1,255 of these institutions, which filed 7.3 million HMDA 
reports that year. See Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council. HMDA Raw Data Software 2004 
(version 3.1) (computer file), Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
  3  Once established, states have rarely changed their 
foreclosure regimes. Since 1938, only eight states have 
switched between non-judicial and judicial foreclosure. 
For more, see Ghent, Andra C. 2012. “The Historical 
Origins of America’s Mortgage Laws.” Research Institute 
for Housing America, Washington, D.C. Further, states’ 
current foreclosure regimes do not appear related to 
current state-level economic conditions or other factors, 
including mortgage default rates. See Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, 
and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. “Foreclosures, House Prices, 
and the Real Economy.” Journal of Finance 70:2587-2634.
  4  Gerardi, Kristopher, Lauren Lambie-Hanson, & Paul S. 
Willen, 2013. “Do borrower rights improve borrower 
outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process.” 
Journal of Urban Economics 73:1.
  5  Demiroglu, Cem, Evan Dudley, & Christopher M. James. 
2014. “State Foreclosure Laws and the Incidence of 
Mortgage Default.” Journal of Law & Economics 57:225.
  6  For each of these borrower protections, the number of 
states with a corresponding provision is as follows: (1) 50 
states, (2) 27 states, (3) 22 states, and (4) 13 states.
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deregulation should consider enacting 
judicial foreclosure or otherwise 
strengthening foreclosure protections.
THE BASICS OF 
FORECLOSURE
State law governs the foreclosure 
process.3  In 2005, eighteen states 
and the District of Columbia 
mandated judicial foreclosure. 
Another three states—Hawaii, Iowa, 
and Wisconsin—set such stringent 
requirements for non-judicial 
foreclosure so as to severely discourage 
the use of that procedure. These 
three states can be considered de facto 
judicial foreclosure states (see Figure 1).
The effects of foreclosures on 
borrower behavior at the back-end 
are well established. We know that 
borrower protections, including 
mandatory judicial foreclosure, serve 
to delay, but typically not to avoid, 
foreclosure.4  Additionally, some 
researchers find that, by lowering the 
costs to borrowers of default, these 
laws can even encourage strategic 
default.5  However, the manner in 
which the legal environment influences 
lender behavior at the front-end (i.e., 
approval decisions and the loan terms 
offered) remains hotly contested, with 
two competing strands of research 
reaching contrary conclusions about 
whether borrower protections, 
including judicial foreclosure, increase 
or decrease loan costs. 
In addition to judicial foreclosure, 
states impose a range of requirements 
on lenders seeking to foreclose, 
concerning (1) the number and timing 
of notices that the lender must send, 
(2) whether the borrower holds a 
statutory right to cure the default, (3) 
the length of any post-sale redemption 
period, and (4) whether the lender 
is permitted to pursue a post-sale 
deficiency judgment, allowing it to 
seize other borrower assets.6  All four 
protections impose costs on lenders 
and, therefore, presumably all four 
could affect the market for mortgages, 
as lenders change their front-end 
behavior in response to back-end 
borrower protections. For this reason, 
I focus on borders between states 
with substantially similar foreclosure 
laws, with the only material difference 
being the presence or absence of a 
judicial foreclosure requirement. 
  7  Nelson, Grant A. & Dale A. Whitman. 2012. Real Estate 
Finance Law. Eagan, Minn.: West Publishing.
  8  Demiroglu, supra note 5.
  9  Collins, J. Michael, Ken Lam, and Christopher E. Herbert. 
2011. “State Mortgage Foreclosure Policies and Lender 
Interventions: Impacts on Borrower Behavior in Default.” 
Journal of Policy Analysis & Management 30:216.
10  Fox, Judith 2015. “The Future of Foreclosure Law.” 
Washburn Law Journal 54:489.
11  Mian, supra note 3.
12  Wassmer, Robert W. 2011. “The Recent Pervasive External 
Effects of Residential Home Foreclosure.” Housing Policy 
Debate 21:247.
 13  Poppe, Emily S. Taylor. 2016. “Formalities on the Books, 
Foreclosures in Action: An Empirical Investigation of the 
Foreclosure Process.” Working paper. Cornell University 
Law School.
 14  Ibid.
 15  Porter, Katherine. 2008. “Misbehavior and Mistake in 
Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims.” Texas Law Review 87:121.
 16  Challenges to allegedly improper fees comprise an 
important subcategory of challenges to the amount owed. 
  17  Pollock, John. 2010. “Lassiter Notwithstanding: The Right 
to Counsel in Foreclosure Actions.” Journal of Poverty Law 
& Policy 43:448.
  18  The particular documentation needed to foreclose, e.g., 
proof of mortgage assignments, varies somewhat by state 
(Fox, 2015). 
  19  Poppe, supra note 13.
  20  Carpenter, David H. 2015. “Robo-Signing” and Other 
Alleged Documentation Problems in Judicial and Non-
judicial Foreclosure Processes.” CRS Report for Congress.
  21  These costs include not only legal fees, but also 
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FIGURE 1 MANDATORY JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES, BY STATE
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JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE  
ON-THE-GROUND
Judicial foreclosure benefits borrowers 
in two respects: it provides a legal 
forum for borrowers to contest 
predatory loans and ensure that 
lenders seeking to foreclose meet the 
legal requirements to do so; it also 
serves as a transfer payment, delaying 
foreclosures and allowing borrowers 
to remain in their homes for longer 
periods while in default. 
The on-the-ground consequences 
of judicial versus non-judicial 
foreclosure differ in at least one 
important respect: the former takes 
substantially longer to complete than 
the latter—about 363 days longer in 
2010.7  By one estimate, foreclosures 
cost an average of $3,112 in judicial 
foreclosure states but only $2,269 in 
other states.8  
The longer procedural periods 
in judicial foreclosure states also 
have second-order effects. Because 
lenders bear the costs of delay, they 
are more likely to pursue alternatives 
to foreclosure—namely, negotiating 
loan modifications with delinquent 
borrowers—in judicial foreclosure 
states.9  And the data back this up: 
fewer foreclosures per default occur in 
judicial foreclosure states.10 
Owners of nearby properties 
and municipal governments also 
benefit when foreclosures are avoided. 
Spillover costs—e.g., failures to 
adequately maintain properties, 
increased vacancy, and feelings of 
decreased neighborhood stability 
among residents—often accompany 
foreclosures. These features tend to 
lower neighborhood property values 
and discourage new investment.11  
Similarly, because foreclosures 
reduce property tax assessments, the 
decreased likelihood of foreclosure 
in judicial foreclosure states benefits 
municipal coffers.12  
However, borrowers generally do 
not avail themselves of important 
rights that the judicial process affords. 
One study found that only 21% of 
borrowers were represented by counsel 
at any point in the foreclosure process. 
Only 24% of borrowers even filed 
an answer. And when borrowers did 
participate, they rarely alerted the 
court to potential defects in lenders’ 
claims.13  Should such findings imply 
that judicial foreclosure requirements 
do not exert any effect? Probably not. 
Lenders in these states could decline 
to initiate foreclosure proceedings 
in marginal cases in these states; 
more rigorously adhere to legal 
requirements at the loan origination 
stage; and tighten their lending 
standards and lean towards offering 
prime rather than subprime loans.  
But the lack of borrower engagement, 
even in judicial foreclosure states,  
is unfortunate. Here is a brief 
summary why.
CHALLENGES TO A 
FORECLOSURE
There are six major issues that 
borrowers facing foreclosure can 
raise, as defenses or counterclaims in 
judicial foreclosure states or as claims 
in a suit filed by the borrower to 
enjoin foreclosure in other states. 
First, the borrower may challenge 
the amount owed. In a random sample 
of almost 1,000 foreclosures filed 
in New York—a judicial foreclosure 
state—one researcher found that 
20% of borrowers claimed that the 
lender failed to credit payments 
received.14  Further, another study 
of bankruptcy filings found that, 
in 70% of bankruptcies, creditors’ 
assertions regarding the size of 
the mortgage debt exceeded the 
borrowers’ figures, whereas borrowers’ 
assertions exceeded creditors’ figures 
in 25% of cases.15  That the borrower 
self-reported greater debts than the 
creditor in one-quarter of the cases 
additional property taxes, insurance, and maintenance 
or depreciation costs, because judicial foreclosures tend 
to take more time to complete. See Fox, supra note 10.
  22  Bocian, Debbie Gruenstein, Keith S. Ernest, & Wei Li. 
2008. “Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home Loan Pricing.” 
Journal of Economics & Business 60:110.
  23  Ibid.
  24  These 14 state pairs are: Connecticut-Massachusetts, 
Delaware-Maryland, Florida-Georgia, Iowa-Minnesota, 
Kentucky-Missouri, Kentucky-Virginia, Louisiana-
Mississippi, Louisiana-Texas, Nebraska-Colorado, 
Nebraska- South Dakota, Ohio-West Virginia, South 
Carolina-Georgia, South Carolina-North Carolina, and 
Wisconsin- Minnesota. In each of these pairs, the state 
that requires judicial foreclosure is listed first.  
  25  FFIEC, supra note 2.
  26  Metzger, Gillian E. 2011. “Federalism under Obama.” 
William & Mary Law Review 53:567.
  27  See, e.g., Landes, William M. & Richard A. Posner. 1987. 
The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
NOTES 
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indicates that the issue is not simply 
systemic underreporting by borrowers, 
but rather often reflects a genuine 
uncertainty on the part of one or 
both parties regarding the size of the 
debt.16  
Second, borrowers may utilize 
state common-law doctrines—
most prominently, fraud and 
unconscionability—in foreclosure 
proceedings. Courts allow these claims 
and defenses in a variety of situations, 
including extensions of credit to low-
income borrowers for whom default 
was reasonably foreseeable; rate- and-
term refinances with inferior terms; 
and approving loans with balloon 
payments to borrowers with fixed or 
declining income. 
Third, where the lender provided 
misinformation or failed to disclose 
certain information prior to loan 
origination, the Truth in Lending 
Act enables the borrower, in limited 
circumstances, to rescind the loan 
agreement.
Fourth, the borrower may 
challenge the lender’s ownership 
of both the note and the mortgage 
document, and, thus, the lender’s  
right to foreclose. As loans are sold 
and resold repeatedly, the likelihood 
that the parties to these transactions 
fail to properly assign the note 
increases. Unsurprisingly, gaps in  
the chain of title are common. One 
study found that the foreclosing  
entity did not show proof 
of ownership of the note in 
approximately 40% of a sample of 
1,700 foreclosures.17  Where the 
lender lacks standing based on 
these defects, it cannot foreclose, 
regardless of whether the borrower is 
delinquent.18 
Fifth, the borrower may argue 
that the lender failed to properly serve 
notice. Although the details differ 
by state, lenders generally must send 
several notices to borrowers in default 
(e.g., a notice of default and notice 
of foreclosure sale). Allegations that 
the lender failed to serve a notice 
of default were raised in 46% of the 
answers filed in one sample.19 
And sixth, the borrower may claim 
that the documents that a lender 
proffers are false or fraudulent. In 
a practice known as “robo-signing,” 
some lenders attempt to create a chain 
of title post hoc, fraudulently creating 
backdated assignments of notes. In the 
wake of robo-signing scandals and, 
relatedly, lenders’ inability to show 
ownership of mortgages during and 
after the financial crisis, three major 
servicers voluntarily stayed foreclosure 
sales in judicial foreclosure states. 
Notably, this stay did not extend 
to foreclosure sales in non-judicial 
foreclosure states, indicating that 
mandatory judicial process is more 
effective than granting borrowers an 
opt-in right to adjudicate.20 
Given all of these scenarios in 
which lenders either can fail to uphold 
their obligations or deliberately 
disadvantage borrowers, providing 
borrowers with automatic access 
to the judicial system by requiring 
lenders to obtain judicial approval to 
foreclose would seem preferable to 
placing the burden on them to file 
suit. But is it?
A CASE FOR MANDATORY 
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
I set out to answer three questions. 
First, since judicial foreclosure saddles 
lenders with greater costs than they 
otherwise would incur if permitted 
to foreclose,21 are lenders less likely 
to approve mortgage applicants 
in judicial foreclosure states than 
otherwise similar applicants in non-
judicial foreclosure states?
Second, based on the theory that 
more costly judicial foreclosures may 
be avoided by offering borrowers 
more manageable terms, are approved 
applicants less likely to be offered 
subprime products in states that 
mandate judicial foreclosure? 
Third, are approved applicants 
with lower socio-economic status 
(e.g., racial or ethnic minorities or 
lower-income applicants) even less 
likely to be offered subprime products 
in judicial foreclosure states?
On this last question, we know 
that mortgage-finance outcomes are 
markedly worse for African American 
and Hispanic borrowers. When 
minority applicants are approved, they 
are substantially more likely to receive 
subprime loans, even when controlling 
for other borrower demographic 
characteristics.22  These disparities 
persist after loan origination. During 
the financial crisis, the foreclosure 
rates for African American and 
Hispanic borrowers were 76% and 
71% higher, respectively, than the rate 
for non-Hispanic white borrowers. 
Once again, this racial gap endures 
after controlling for income and 
other factors.23  We should expect the 
benefits of judicial foreclosure to be 
amplified for these borrowers. 
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To answer these questions,  
I examined lender behavior in 14 
pairs of neighboring states, where one 
state mandated judicial foreclosure 
and the other did not.24  Importantly, 
this analysis controlled for not only 
the demographic characteristics of 
loan applicants and those of their 
communities on either side of the 
state border—it also examined only 
the subset of loan applications for 
which the governing legal regime 
(namely, mortgage-finance and 
banking regulations and other aspects 
of state foreclosure law) were nearly 
identical in both states within each  
of the 14 pairs.
This analysis revealed that the 
answer to each of the three questions 
is ‘yes.’ Overall, judicial foreclosure 
requirements are associated with 
an approximate 2.1-2.8% reduction 
in the likelihood of loan approval 
and, conditional on loan approval, a 
0.2-1.0% reduction in the likelihood 
of being offered a subprime loan. 
While not monumental, reductions 
of this size in a sample of 7.3 million 
loan applications are noteworthy.25  
Further, there is suggestive evidence 
that these effects are amplified for 
lower-income borrowers, although 
I do not find more pronounced 
effects for racial or ethnic minority 
borrowers. Finally, the notion that 
lenders “pass on the costs” of this 
borrower protection in the form of 
higher rates is firmly rejected.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
With the post-financial crisis turn 
towards federalism in consumer 
protection law,26 and more recent 
cracks in the federal banking 
regulatory infrastructure, policymakers 
need a firm grasp of the effects of 
foreclosure law on housing finance 
markets. Specifically, they should 
understand that judicial foreclosure 
can serve a similar function as ex ante 
regulation.27  
The prospect that a lender seeking 
to foreclose on a mortgage may be 
penalized for its earlier behavior may 
incent the lender to alter its behavior 
at the loan origination stage, taking 
greater care to abide by the Truth in 
Lending Act and other laws. Lenders 
also may take greater care not to 
engage in lending practices—like 
offering balloon payments to low-
income borrowers—that increase 
the likelihood of default. In this 
way, borrower protections at the 
foreclosure stage may function as 
a form of back-end regulation of 
mortgage lending. 
Here, there is a clear role for 
states to play. Although historically 
states have been reluctant to switch 
foreclosure regimes, there is now a 
compelling case that borrowers (and 
local communities) fare better when 
the legal burden to file suit falls to 
lenders. On the one hand, judicial 
foreclosure adds to state courts’ 
dockets and increases lenders’ costs 
by allowing borrowers to remain 
in their homes for longer. On the 
other hand, it provides a way for 
state legislatures to help some of 
their most economically vulnerable 
citizens and communities. That 
judicial foreclosure can be established 
at the state level, without the need 
for buy-in from federal banking 
and consumer financial protection 
regulators, should be particularly 
attractive for states looking to alter 
lender behavior—especially subprime 
lending to lower-income borrowers—
at a time when federal regulators may 
be going in retreat. Regardless of how 
one weighs these considerations, given 
the importance of mortgage-finance 
to the overall economy and the 
psychological value that Americans 
place on homeownership, the stakes 
are too high not to appreciate the 
effects of judicial foreclosure laws on 
mortgage lending.
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